Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

808 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Marshall arrived in his offi ce, Bratton “kept [Marshall’s] copy [of
the “One p.m. Message”] in my hands until I gave it to [Marshall]
in his offi ce.” 250 Marshall had returned Bratton’s call “in person
sometime between 10 and 10:30.” Bratton “explained to him that
I had a most important message that he must see at once, and
that if he would stay where he was, I would get a car and bring
it to him.” 251 Bratton thought he “could have gotten there in 10
minutes.” 252 Marshall replied, “No, don’t bother to do that. I am
coming down to my offi ce. You can give it to me then.” 253
Marshall fi nally arrived about an hour later, at 11:25 a.m.
Bratton couldn’t explain why it had apparently taken Marshall
an hour or more to reach the War Department, when it was normally
a ten-minute trip from his quarters to his offi ce. 254 It took
Marshall only ten minutes to make that same trip in the afternoon
after he had heard the news of the attack. 255
After his phone conversation with Marshall, Bratton “went
up towards General Marshall’s offi ce, and stood around there in
the hall, or in the offi ce of the secretary of the General Staff ,
waiting for General Marshall to arrive.” When Marshall fi nally
arrived at 11:25, he “went into his offi ce from the door that opens
into the hall and General Miles and I . . . not more than a minute
or 2 minutes after that walked in through the other door.” 256
Bratton was “positive” that when he reached Marshall’s offi ce
at 11:25, the chief of staff had on his desk all 14 parts of the message
that Bratton had not delivered to him. 257 Bratton was waiting
250Ibid., p. 4524.
251Ibid., p. 4525.
252Ibid., p. 4546.
253Ibid., p. 4525.
254Ibid., pp. 4548–50.
255Ibid., part 14, p. 1411, Exhibit 39.
256Ibid., part 9, pp. 4546, 4573.
257 Ibid., p. 4544.