Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 807
stunned me into frenzied activity because of its implications
and from that time on I was busily engaged trying to locate
various offi cers of the General Staff and conferring with them
on the exclusive subject of this message and its meaning. 247
Bratton said he “washed my hands of all other matters, turning
them over to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to
take steps with the 1:00 p.m. delivery message.” When he
discovered that neither the Chief of Staff [Marshall], Chief
of War Plans Division [Gerow], or G-2 [Miles], were in their
offi ces [I] immediately put in a phone call for General Marshall
at his quarters at Fort Myer. One of his orderlies answered the
telephone and informed me that the General had gone horseback
riding.
Bratton asked the orderly to fi nd Marshall and “tell him who I
am and tell him to go to the nearest telephone, that it is vitally
important that I communicate with him at the earliest practicable
moment.” Th e orderly assured Bratton he would do so. 248
He then phoned Miles at his home and told him to come
to the offi ce. Miles came in about 10:00. Bratton discussed “this
whole business with General Miles in his offi ce. . . . So that
General Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter”
before he and Bratton went together later into Marshall’s offi ce
after he had arrived. Bratton or Miles had then phoned Gerow,
although Bratton said he didn’t “remember seeing General Gerow
that morning until he joined us in General Marshall’s offi ce” at
about 11:25. 249
Bratton’s frantic call had reached Marshall’s orderly “shortly
after 9:00,” probably between 9 and 9:15. From that time until
247Ibid., p. 4517.
248Ibid., p. 4524.
249Ibid., p. 4525.