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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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60 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Communists from harassing their northern border. 20 On April 13,<br />

1941, Japan signed a “neutrality pact” with Russia to safeguard<br />

her position in the north <strong>and</strong> to make it possible for her to pursue<br />

her plans southward. 21<br />

U.S. War Planning with Britain<br />

Secret U.S.-British staff conversations, held in Washington<br />

from January 29 to March 27, 1941, led to an agreement on joint<br />

strategy. (American <strong>of</strong>fi cials had already met with British counterparts<br />

in London in January 1938, before the war in Europe<br />

began, <strong>and</strong> again in August 1940, after Engl<strong>and</strong> was at war with<br />

Germany.) Th e British sent naval <strong>and</strong> military <strong>of</strong>fi cers as envoys,<br />

attired in civilian dress to conceal the true nature <strong>of</strong> their mission.<br />

Th e stated purpose <strong>of</strong> these secret ABC meetings (American-<br />

British-Conversations) was “To coordinate, on broad lines, plans<br />

for the employment <strong>of</strong> the forces <strong>of</strong> the Associated Powers” <strong>and</strong><br />

“To reach agreements concerning the methods <strong>and</strong> nature <strong>of</strong><br />

Military Cooperation between the two nations.” Th e agreements<br />

were to cover the “principal areas <strong>of</strong> responsibility,” <strong>and</strong> “the<br />

major lines <strong>of</strong> Military strategy to be pursued by both nations.” 22<br />

20 Th e Japanese<br />

“had four ends in view: to secure their Manchurian frontier with<br />

the Soviet Union, thus enabling them to move southwards without<br />

having to look over their shoulders; to obtain oil supplies <strong>and</strong> concessions<br />

from the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s East Indies by means other than the<br />

use <strong>of</strong> force, thus making themselves less dependent on the United<br />

States; to obtain complete control <strong>of</strong> Indo-China, so as to be able to<br />

occupy, at an appropriate moment, Siamese territory as a base from<br />

which to mount an attack on Malaya, <strong>and</strong> to prevent the United<br />

States either from entering the war on the side <strong>of</strong> Britain or interfering<br />

with their own plans for their southward advance.” (Kirby, Th e<br />

War Against Japan, p. 59)<br />

21 Ibid., p. 61.<br />

2279th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:

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