Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

806 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
After delivering the “One p.m. Message” at State, Kramer had
gone to the White House “to deliver the same set of traffi c.” 243
Intercept Indicating Actual Approach of War
Delivered to the Army Sunday Morning
“On or about December 10, 1941” Miles and Bratton drafted
“a memorandum for the record, of [their] recollection of what took
place in General Marshall’s offi ce that morning” of December
7. 244 Bratton had referred to this memorandum when appearing
before both the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Clarke’s investigation.
245 Most of Bratton’s testimony before the JCC concerning
the events of this morning were also based on that memorandum.
Bratton told the JCC that “the fourteenth part of the [ Japanese]
message was not delivered to me until between 8 and 9:00; around
8:15 or 8:30” on the morning of December 7. It had then been
“delivered immediately to the State Department.” Bratton didn’t
remember whether he had taken it himself.
It is entirely possible that I may have gotten a car and rushed
over there with the 14th part so that the Secretary of State’s
book would be complete. On the other hand, I may have given
it to Colonel Dusenbury to deliver.
In any event Bratton knew that “the Secretary of State had all 14
of the parts before 10 o’clock that morning.” 246
He continued:
[A]t about 9:00 or shortly before 9:00 there was placed in my
hands the so-called 1:00 p.m. delivery message. Th is immediately
243 Ibid., part 8, p. 3911. Kramer testimony.
244 Ibid., part 29, p. 2347, APHB.
245 Ibid., part 34, p. 19, Clarke investigation.
246 Ibid., part 9, p. 4516.