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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 3 805<br />

[T]he reference to <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> was purely a passing reference<br />

for the benefi t <strong>of</strong> non-naval personnel, namely, these foreign<br />

service <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>and</strong> the Army <strong>of</strong>fi cer present. . . . [He] never<br />

intended in the least to imply that those remarks . . . indicated<br />

an attack on <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>, or, in fact, any overt intention on the<br />

part <strong>of</strong> the Japanese directed toward the United States. 241<br />

He had only intended to comment “on how the hour [1:00 p.m.<br />

EDT] tied with the sun <strong>and</strong> moves in progress elsewhere;” 242<br />

Pibul, who had been maintaining, for some time past, the position that<br />

his country was neutral, that any foreign nation that invaded his quarters<br />

would be considered an enemy, <strong>and</strong> that the moment such an invasion<br />

took place he would call on the other party for assistance. By ‘other<br />

party’ I refer to Japan or to Britain.”<br />

Ibid., part 9, pp. 4110, 4116. Excerpts <strong>of</strong> Kramer’s 1944 memor<strong>and</strong>um<br />

reprinted. Kramer explained the signifi cance <strong>of</strong> the “One p.m. Message” for<br />

Knox’s benefi t, as he <strong>of</strong>ten had explained other Japanese intercepts to the Navy<br />

personnel authorized to see them:<br />

Th e implications were so obvious in the light <strong>of</strong> what we know,<br />

that it was not necessary to state that invasion <strong>of</strong> British territory was<br />

undoubtedly scheduled for 1300 (EDT), <strong>and</strong> that at least a complete<br />

break with the U.S. was scheduled simultaneously. . . . I recollect<br />

conversation only for Mr. Knox’ benefi t regarding the implications <strong>of</strong><br />

the 1300 hour. I distinctly remember that the tie-up <strong>of</strong> these times<br />

would be apparent to experienced naval <strong>of</strong>fi cers, but that a civilian (Mr.<br />

Knox) might overlook it. Hence the pains I took to point it out at the<br />

State Department. I repeated this point at least half a dozen times that<br />

morning to others, chiefl y subordinates, I think, but including one <strong>of</strong><br />

Mr. Hull’s secretaries who h<strong>and</strong>led this material for him, to one or two<br />

<strong>of</strong> my <strong>of</strong>fi ce workers, <strong>and</strong> I believe also to Colonel Bratton [the Army<br />

courier] in Mr. Hull’s outer <strong>of</strong>fi ce, probably to Comm<strong>and</strong>er Wellborn,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Admiral’s fl ag secretary, possibly to McCollum, <strong>and</strong> probably to<br />

you [Saff ord] too.”<br />

241 Ibid., part 9, pp. 4180–82. Kramer testimony.<br />

242Ibid., p. 4180. Kramer quoting from 1944 memor<strong>and</strong>um prepared for<br />

Halsey.

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