Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

804 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Kramer said he had not then seen Knox personally, and he had
“most emphatically not” sent him a note. “Th ere was only the
verbal explanation.” 239 Kramer had not said that the time, 1:00,
had “any signifi cance in connection with any attack at Pearl
Harbor.” 240 It had been Saff ord’s interpretation, Kramer said later,
that turned that remark into a reference to Pearl Harbor.
earlier have been that it was his Flag Secretary, then Commander Wellborn.
Th at has only quite recently been corrected on that score since I
am informed that Wellborn was not there that morning at all. My
recollections were fully refreshed in a conversation only in the last few
days with Captain McCollum to the eff ect that he was the one who
came to the door. I distinctly recollect that now. I further recollect
pointing out to Captain McCollum the tie-up of the time, 1:00 Washington,
with the scheme that had been developing for the past week or
so in the Southwest Pacifi c with reference to Malaya and the Kra
Peninsula. Captain McCollum reacted instantaneously to my pointing
that out. His reactions, I believe, were identical with mine. I do not
believe our conversation lasted more than 10 seconds or so, and then I
headed for the State Department.
Ibid., part 8, p. 3910:
[Arriving at State at about 10:45, Kramer made delivery to] one of
the private secretaries of Mr. Hull. . . . Before that folder was taken in
to Mr. Hull there was a brief conversation of the identical nature that
I had had with Captain McCollum at Admiral Stark’s door, pointing
out the tie-up of the time 1:00 Washington, with the situation in the
Southwest Pacifi c.
Richardson: One o’clock Washington meant dawn in Hawaii, did
it not?
Kramer: It was 7:30 in Hawaii, yes, sir.
Richardson: And was that fact pointed out in your conversation
with McCollum, and at the State Department?
Kramer: It was mentioned in passing, yes, sir.
239Ibid., p. 3911. Kramer testimony.
240Ibid., pp. 3909–12. Kramer testimony:
Questioned by Richardson, Kramer said: “Th e primary point of
that [the 1:00 delivery time] was the conviction, at least in my mind,
that the Japanese intended to carry out their plans against Kota Bharu,
with the intention and purpose of forcing the hand of the Th ai Premier,