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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 3 803<br />

At the JCC, he changed the sequence <strong>of</strong> his deliveries slightly,<br />

saying that after delivering fi rst to CNO Stark, he had delivered<br />

it secondly to Knox at the State Department <strong>and</strong> then fi nally to<br />

the White House. 236<br />

When Kramer testifi ed before the JCC about delivering<br />

the “One p.m. Message” to Navy Secretary Knox at the State<br />

Department, where Knox was still meeting with Secretary <strong>of</strong><br />

State Hull, he said that before the folder was taken in to Mr.<br />

Hull “there was a brief conversation . . . pointing out the tie-up <strong>of</strong><br />

the time 1:00 Washington, with the situation in the Southwest<br />

Pacifi c.” Kramer had talked with one <strong>of</strong> Mr. Hull’s private secretaries<br />

about that, also with the Army courier, he thought it could<br />

have been Bratton who was there at the time making delivery to<br />

Secretaries Hull <strong>and</strong> Stimson. 237<br />

Saff ord had told the NCI that when Kramer made delivery<br />

to Knox at the State Department on Sunday morning, December<br />

7, Kramer had sent a note via Knox’s personal aide, a foreign service<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi cer, “saying in eff ect, that this means a sunrise attack on<br />

<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> today <strong>and</strong> possibly a midnight attack on Manila.” 238<br />

the attention <strong>of</strong> Mr. Knox” through a State Department Foreign<br />

Service Offi cer who regularly h<strong>and</strong>led this material for Mr. Hull “the<br />

implications <strong>of</strong> the times.” 1300 Washington time was 7:30 at <strong>Pearl</strong><br />

<strong>Harbor</strong> <strong>and</strong> a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu, where the Japanese<br />

appeared to be heading.<br />

236Ibid., part 8, pp. 3909–12. Kramer testimony:<br />

Kramer told the JCC (part 8, pp. 3910–12) that he had delivered<br />

the “One p.m. Message” to (1) the State Department where he had<br />

“most emphatically not” spoken with Knox, (2) the White House, <strong>and</strong><br />

then (3) back to the Navy Department.<br />

237Ibid., part 8, pp. 3910, 3912. Kramer testimony.<br />

238Ibid., part 9, p. 4180. Excerpt reprinted from Saff ord NCI testimony.<br />

Ibid., part 9, p. 3909. Kramer testimony:<br />

Kramer: I stopped <strong>of</strong>f at Admiral Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce [Stark was in his<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi ce; it was between 10:30 <strong>and</strong> 10:35]. . . . Th e <strong>of</strong>fi ce door was closed.<br />

. . . Word was sent in . . . that I had something for him. My impressions

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