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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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802 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

to his second round <strong>of</strong> deliveries. 233 In his 1944 memor<strong>and</strong>um<br />

for Admiral Halsey, Kramer had described in “pretty meticulous<br />

detail” 234 his haste to deliver the “One p.m. Message” that Sunday<br />

morning, December 7.<br />

In his testimony before the NCI in 1944 Kramer said that on<br />

this, his second trip <strong>of</strong> the morning, he had fi rst delivered the “One<br />

p.m. Message” to Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce between 1030 <strong>and</strong> 1100, secondly<br />

to the White House <strong>and</strong> fi nally to Navy Secretary Knox who was<br />

still in a meeting at the State Department with Secretary Hull. 235<br />

233Ibid., part 8, pp. 3908–09. Kramer testimony before the Joint Committee:<br />

Kramer: On my arrival there [back at the Navy Department] at<br />

10:20, the most striking recollection I have is the fi rst sighting <strong>of</strong> that<br />

message from Tokyo directing the delivery <strong>of</strong> this note from Tokyo at<br />

1:00 p.m., December 7, Washington time . . . I immediately instructed<br />

my chief yeoman to prepare another set <strong>of</strong> folders so I could make<br />

immediate delivery <strong>of</strong> them. . . . Just as I was about to leave the <strong>of</strong>fi ce, a<br />

plain language Japanese message was sent in to my <strong>of</strong>fi ce by the GY<br />

watch <strong>of</strong>fi cer that carried, I believe the so-called hidden word message.<br />

. . . I recognized it as such from an external indicator, namely the word<br />

“Stop” at the end, <strong>and</strong> recognized the fi rst word as being one <strong>of</strong> the<br />

code words referring to Engl<strong>and</strong>. In scanning the rest <strong>of</strong> the message,<br />

as I recollect, the sixth or seventh word had another code word, which,<br />

incidentally, were all proper names. Th e word was “Hattori” which,<br />

although I recognized [it] as a code word, I did not immediately recall<br />

the meaning <strong>of</strong>, <strong>and</strong> hastily referred to the list <strong>of</strong> such code words . . .<br />

interpreted as “relations between Japan <strong>and</strong> (blank) country,” to be<br />

inserted, was not in accordance with expectations. I dictated to my<br />

chief yeoman the sense <strong>of</strong> that message.<br />

234Ibid., part 9, p. 4110. Keefe’s description <strong>of</strong> Kramer’s 1944 account.<br />

235Ibid., part 33, pp. 859–60. Kramer testimony re “One p.m. Message” at the<br />

NCI in mid-1944:<br />

At the NCI, Kramer said that he had returned to the Navy Department<br />

after his fi rst delivery on the morning <strong>of</strong> December 7. Th ere<br />

he had discovered the “One p.m. Message” along with several others.<br />

Within ten or fi fteen minutes he was at Admiral Stark’s <strong>of</strong>fi ce. From<br />

there he had gone to the White House <strong>and</strong> then [italics added] to State,<br />

where Knox <strong>and</strong> Stimson were meeting with Hull. Kramer said he had<br />

not seen Knox personally, but he had “made a point <strong>of</strong> verbally inviting

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