Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 801
go to Admiral Stark’s offi ce until about 9:30,” although he admitted
he was “still a little hazy on precise times.” 228
When Kramer reached Stark’s offi ce on Sunday morning,
December 7, all of the higher Navy echelon, including, Stark,
Wilkinson, and Turner, were there. Kramer agreed with
Congressman Keefe who was questioning him that “Sunday was
not usually a day for the big boys in the Navy to assemble at their
offi ces” 229 and that the arrangements for such a group of top level
offi cers to meet that Sunday morning must have been made the
night before. 230 It was “no formal conference, but many offi cers
were in Admiral Stark’s offi ce, and going and coming.” Kramer
said,
It was in a similar manner that the normal 11:00 conference
was held more or less daily in Admiral Stark’s offi ce, similarly
assembled. . . . However, it was no formal conference but a continuing
discussion that Sunday morning. 231
After making his fi rst round of deliveries that Sunday morning,
Kramer returned to the Navy Department. Th ere he had encountered
the “One p.m. Message” plus several other intercepts 232
with fi nal words of advice and thanks to the Japanese ambassadors
for their eff orts. Kramer recognized the importance of the
“One p.m.Message” immediately and this added special urgency
228Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, pp. 4102–03. Kramer testimony.
229Ibid., p. 4097. Kramer February 9, 1946 testimony.
230Ibid., p. 4098. Kramer February 9, 1946 testimony.
231Ibid., p. 4105. Kramer testimony.
232Ibid., p. 3997. Including also the “Pilot Message,” if Bratton’s “refreshed”
JCC testimony is believed, although Bratton doesn’t mention it in his testimony
concerning his Sunday morning delivery rounds.