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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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798 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Th irty two years after the attack, evidence <strong>of</strong> just such a<br />

December 6–7 White House meeting surfaced. It came in a letter<br />

from James G. Stahlman, a longtime friend <strong>of</strong> Knox, then<br />

on active duty in the Navy. On his return from <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong><br />

immediately after the attack, Knox confi ded to Stahlman “that<br />

he, Stimson, Marshall, Betty Stark <strong>and</strong> Harry Hopkins had spent<br />

most <strong>of</strong> the night before [the attack] at the White House with<br />

FDR, all waiting for what they knew was coming after those<br />

intercepts.” 226<br />

Intercept Heralding Actual<br />

Approach <strong>of</strong> War Delivered to the Navy<br />

Sunday Morning, December 7<br />

Saturday evening, with the delivery <strong>of</strong> the fi rst thirteen parts<br />

<strong>of</strong> Japan’s 14-part reply to our note <strong>of</strong> November 26, it was apparent<br />

that war with Japan was imminent. It was the next morning,<br />

Sunday, December 7, 1941, that the Japanese intercepts that heralded<br />

the fi nal approach <strong>of</strong> war were received in Washington.<br />

Most notable among these were the fourteenth part <strong>of</strong> Tokyo’s<br />

reply <strong>and</strong> the “One p.m. Message” giving the Japanese ambassadors<br />

in Washington instructions as to precisely how <strong>and</strong> when to<br />

deliver that reply to Secretary <strong>of</strong> State Hull. JCC members<br />

devoted considerable time to asking Navy courier Kramer about<br />

his Sunday morning deliveries.<br />

Kramer had said in his 1944 memor<strong>and</strong>um that on his fi rst<br />

trip Sunday morning he had seen Stark with others in his <strong>of</strong>fi ce<br />

“[a]bout 0900” when he, Kramer, had “left night-before matters,” 227<br />

including all fourteen parts <strong>of</strong> Japan’s reply to our note <strong>of</strong><br />

226James G. Stahlman letter <strong>of</strong> November 26, 1973 to Admiral Kemp Tolley.<br />

227Th e sequence <strong>of</strong> Kramer’s December 7 morning deliveries varied slightly<br />

from account to account:<br />

At the NCI ( Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 33, pp.<br />

858–60), in mid-1944, he said he had delivered the 13 parts plus part 14<br />

<strong>and</strong> other new material to (1) Stark, (2) the White House <strong>and</strong> (3) Knox

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