Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

794 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
to state, in substance, that he would reach the admiral later,
that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the admiral
paged or otherwise when in the theater, where, I believe, the
fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and that if he
had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of
the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused,
and the president did not wish that to happen because he could
get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case. 219
According to Schulz, nothing was said about telephoning
anybody else. “To the best of my knowledge that is all that was
discussed. Th e president returned the papers to me and I left the
study.” Schulz had been there about a half hour; he left about
ten. 220
He then went back to the offi ce “over toward the State
Department. . . . on the basement level.” Kramer was waiting.
According to Schulz’s recollection, he returned the locked pouch
to Kramer.
Th e happenings during that particular period are somewhat
hazy but I know that I did not have the papers the next day.
Further, I hadn’t too suitable a place to put them during the
night because of their high secrecy classifi cation. . . . I would
not have kept them under any circumstances. 221
Schulz phoned Beardall “to inform him that I had received
the papers, the president had seen them and I had carried out
my instructions.” Schulz was then free to go home. He “left the
White House at about 10:30.” 222
Schulz’s testimony demolished the administration’s claim
of shocked surprise at the Japanese attack. The Democratic
219 Ibid.
220Ibid., p. 4664.
221Ibid., p. 4665.
222Ibid., p. 4666.