Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 793
Schulz continued:
Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly
going to come at the convenience of the Japanese, it was
too bad that we could not strike the fi rst blow and prevent
any sort of surprise. Th e president nodded and then said, in
eff ect, “No, we can’t do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful
people.” Th en he raised his voice, and this much I remember
defi nitely. He said, “But we have a good record.” 216
Schulz got the impression that “we would have to stand on
that record, we could not make the fi rst overt move. We would
have to wait until it came.” 217
Th e only geographic name Schulz remembered was Indochina.
Th ere was no mention of Pearl Harbor. Th e time when war might
begin was not discussed. “[T]here was no indication that tomorrow
was necessarily the day,” he said. Schulz “carried that impression
away because it contributed to my personal surprise when
the news did come.” According to Schulz, “Th ere was no mention
made of sending any further warning or alert.” 218
After the discussion to the eff ect that the war was going to
begin at the convenience of the Japanese, the president said
he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get
Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined—I
do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator
told the president that Admiral Stark could be reached at the
National Th eater.
Schulz could not hear what the operator said, but he did hear
the National Th eater mentioned. Th e president then went on
216 Ibid., p. 4663.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.