Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

792 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
packed hearing room listened in complete silence, straining to
catch his every word.
Counsel Richardson asked Schulz if he could remember
anything specifi c that FDR or Hopkins had said. Schulz could
remember only a few words, but he could say “defi nitely” that
the substance of it was that—I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned
it fi rst—that since war was imminent, that the Japanese
intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when
all was most opportune for them. . . . Th at is, when their forces
were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina
in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had
already landed there and there were implications of where they
would move next. 213
Th e president mentioned having sent a message to the
Japanese emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in
Indochina and requesting their withdrawal. 214 Schulz did not see
Roosevelt’s message, but he recalled
the president quoting from this message that he drafted to the
eff ect that he had told Hirohito that he could not see how it
could be held that there was any danger to peace in the Far
East as far as the United States was concerned if there were no
Japanese forces in Indochina.
In other words, we were not going to attack Indochina, nor
was anyone else. Th erefore the presence of Japanese forces in
Indochina was for an aggressive purpose or for ulterior purposes
on the part of the Japanese. We ourselves held no threat
for Indochina. 215
213Ibid., pp. 4662–63.
214Ibid., p. 4663.
215Ibid., p. 4671.