Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 789
with whom I talked here in Washington, my conversations
with General Miles before he appeared before the Committee,
all of these have combined to lead me to the belief that the
evidence that I have given before the committee today is my
best recollection of the facts. 200
After the lengthy questioning of Saff ord, Kramer, Bratton,
and all the other offi cers concerned, it was diffi cult to know just
what to believe. Th eir testimony had often been confusing and
contradictory. Kramer’s testimony did little to clear up the mystery
over whether a “Winds Execute” had been intercepted before
December 7—or if it had been, what it had meant. His testimony
about the “Pilot Message” raised questions as to whether it was
actually received before or after the 14-part response itself. And
Bratton’s testimony on the delivery of the Japanese intercepts
during the evening of December 6 helped little in clarifying the
situation.
Intercepts Indicating Imminence of
War Delivered to the White House
Evening, December 6
At my suggestion, committee member requested a list of all
persons who had been on duty at the White House on December
6 and 7. One name on that list was Navy Commander Lester R.
Schulz.
On February 12, 1946, while at sea aboard the Indiana, Schulz
received orders to come to Washington. 201 When he arrived at the
Capitol, Senator Ferguson and Lieutenant Commander Baecher,
assistant counsel and the Navy’s liaison to the committee, took
him aside in a room adjoining the chamber where the hearings
200 Ibid., part 9, pp. 4597; part 10, 4611–12.
201 Ibid., pp. 4668–69.