Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

788 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
General Miles who had already seen it at Admiral Wilkinson’s
house?”
“Th is is the point” Bratton said at which his “memory begins
to go bad”; he could “not state positively whether there was any
delivery made that night or not at this time.” He had testifi ed
before the APHB that he “had made delivery to the Secretary of
the General Staff , to the night duty offi cer, or to General Gerow
and to General Miles.” Th at, Bratton said, was his “normal procedure.”
He “tried to make simultaneous delivery to all these
people.” However, when he made that statement to the APHB
he “had not remembered . . . that Colonel Dusenbury was working
with me in the offi ce that night.” 198 Also Clausen had shown
him a number of sworn affi davits collected from various offi cers:
Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, Gerow, Gailey, and others
to the eff ect that they did not receive the 13 parts of this message
from me or from anyone else Saturday night. Now, I
know all these men. I do not doubt the honesty and integrity
of any one of them, and if they say that I did not deliver these
pouches to them that night, then my memory must have been
at fault. 199
Asked by Ferguson why he had changed his testimony,
Bratton replied:
It was a combination of facts, sir. . . . My subsequent recollection
that Colonel Dusenbury was at work with me in the offi ce
that evening . . . and the affi davits of various offi cers stating that
I did not make deliveries to them on Saturday evening, and my
recollection of the telephone conversation with General Miles
at about half-past eleven Saturday night, my subsequent conversations
with Colonel Dusenbury, with whom I have talked
here in Washington, my conversations with General Gerow,
198 Ibid., p. 4515.
199 Ibid.