Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 787
described the 13 parts “in guarded terms” and added that the 14th
and most important part had not yet been received. Miles said he
had seen the 13 parts where he had been a dinner guest. Bratton
also told Miles that he, Miles, had delivered the fi rst 13 parts to
Hull. 195 Kaufman asked Bratton if Miles had told him it wasn’t
necessary to deliver the 13 parts to Marshall that night. Bratton
remembered no such instructions. Kaufman then read into the
record Miles’s JCC testimony, in which he took
full responsibility for that . . . message not going to the Chief
of Staff that night. . . . I knew its substance. I did not consider
that it was necessary to arouse the Chief of Staff at that time of
night for that message. 196
After having this testimony called to his attention, Bratton added:
“I would like to say further at this point that if there was any error
of omission or commission with respect to the delivery of the
13 parts of that message Saturday night of the 6th of December
1941 to Army personnel the error was mine, and I accept full
responsibility for it.” 197 In this way, both Miles and Bratton added
their names to the list of those willing to take the responsibility
for a possible failure on the part of Marshall.
Denials by Top Officials Lead Bratton to
Doubt His Earlier Testimony
Th e persons in the Army who “customarily” received MAGIC,
Bratton said, were Marshall, Gerow, and Miles. “And do we have
it now,” Kaufman asked, “that no delivery was made to any of
those persons other than to the Secretary of State and excepting
195Ibid., p. 4514.
196Ibid., part 3, p. 1554.
197Ibid., part 9, p. 4515.