Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

786 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
I would like to state that this is the fi fth time I have appeared
as a witness in this Pearl Harbor investigation, I hope it will
be the last time, but it is also the fi rst time that I have had
an opportunity to examine fi les, records and documents in the
War Department to refresh my memory as to the details of
various events and it is the fi rst time that I have had an opportunity
to talk to the people I worked for and with at that time.
In consequence my memory as to the details of certain events
have [sic] been greatly improved. As to the details of certain
other events it is foggier than ever for the reason that I have
heard and seen so many confl icting arguments and statements
here and elsewhere since my return to Washington. 193
Returning to the 13 parts:
Th ere are several details . . . that stand out very clearly in my
mind. . . . First, I called up the SIS [Signal Intelligence Service]
. . . to ask if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part
coming in later that night [December 6]. . . . After some discussion
in the SIS, this offi cer returned to the phone and he
said “No, there is very little likelihood of that part coming in
this evening.”
Bratton knew Hull had a strong interest in this message, so he
put the 13 parts in the pouch, locked it, and delivered it personally
to the State Department’s night duty offi cer some time
after 10:00 p.m. He advised the night duty offi cer that this was
“a highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was
concerned” and it should be sent out to his quarters immediately.
Bratton was assured it would be. 194
Th en at about 11:00 p.m. Bratton had returned to his quarters.
From there he phoned Miles’s home and was told he was
out. When Miles got home and returned Bratton’s call, Bratton
193Ibid., p. 4510.
194Ibid., pp. 4513–14.