Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 785
offi cials in Washington on Saturday afternoon, for several Navy
offi cers testifi ed that it had been phoned or distributed to the
usual Navy recipients by then. 189
Bratton told the JCC the message had fi rst come to his attention
at about 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, that it had been translated by
the Army, typed, and delivered to him. He then had it distributed
“that afternoon about 3:00” 190 to the full list of persons for whom
he was responsible. 191 Bratton said he even recalled discussing its
contents with both Gerow and Miles. 192
If the “Pilot Message” had been decoded and distributed on
Saturday, as Bratton testifi ed, then Washington offi cials would
have been on notice that Tokyo’s reply to our November 26 note
was on its way. Th ey expected this reply to be a rejection of our
proposal, so they would have had reason to anticipate a fi nal
break with Japan, possibly the outbreak of war, and would have
had some opportunity to think about how best to respond. If it
had not been available until Sunday morning, as Kramer said, the
top personnel would not have been expecting Japan’s response
and would have had little time to anticipate and decide how to
respond to the Japanese threat.
When the fi rst 13 parts of Japan’s reply, which had been intercepted,
decoded, and typed up by early Saturday evening, were
actually placed in the hands of the top Washington offi cials was
crucial for determining what we knew of Japan’s intentions prior
to the attack. Bratton had testifi ed variously about his deliveries
of this intercept. JCC Associate General Counsel Kaufman asked
him about these several discrepancies.
“Now, before answering your question,” Bratton began,
189 Ibid., part 3, p. 1874; part 4, pp. 1761, 1874, 1972, 2056; part 10, p. 4668.
190Ibid., part 9, pp. 4509–12.
191Ibid., p. 4513.
192Ibid., pp. 4513, 4536.