Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

784 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the night duty offi cer at the State Department. He also said in his
affi davit that the sets for the other offi cials on Bratton’s list “were
delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth
part.” Bratton had said that when he saw Marshall that
morning, Marshall had on his desk the 14-part message, which
he “had not given him.” He could not explain how it had reached
Marshall. According to Bratton,
Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary
to my statements here [the affi davit for Clausen] . . .
should be modifi ed and considered changed in accordance with
my statements herein. Th is affi davit now represents my best
recollection . . . after having my memory refreshed in several
ways and respects. 186
By the time Bratton was fi nally called to the witness stand
by the Joint Congressional Committee, he had been listening for
months to the sworn testimony of witnesses, some of whom had
contradicted one another; some had even contradicted their own
earlier testimony, and some had off ered to shoulder the blame for
Marshall’s possible delinquencies. 187 As the bewildered Bratton
took the chair on February 14, 1946, suspense pervaded the
packed hearing room.
Delivery to Top Officials Evening of December
6 of Japanese Reply to U.S. “Ultimatum”
Respecting the receipt of the “Pilot Message,” Bratton contradicted
the testimony of his Navy opposite, Kramer. Kramer’s
“refreshed” testimony was that the message had not reached
him, ready for delivery, until about 10 or 10:30 Sunday morning,
December 7. 188 However, it was undoubtedly available to Navy
186 Ibid., part 35, pp. 96–98, Bratton affi davit.
187 Ibid., part 3, p. 1036.
188 Ibid., part 9, pp. 4015, 4018–19, 4022, 4101–02.