Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 783 On September 30, 1944, when appearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Bratton testifi ed that he had “had the bulk of it [the Japanese reply] since the evening” of December 6. “It came in fourteen parts. . . . Th irteen of those parts were received the afternoon and evening of the 6th.” 183 He said he had delivered the fi rst 13 parts to three recipients that evening: “the offi ce of the Chief of Staff [actually Marshall’s secretary, Colonel, later General, Bedell Smith], the A.C. of S. G-2 [actually Gerow’s executive offi cer, Colonel Gailey], the offi ce of the Secretary of State.” 184 On July 27, 1945, in an affi davit for Clausen, who was touring the Army’s several theaters of operations under orders of Stimson to interview and collect sworn affi davits from persons involved in some way with Pearl Harbor, Bratton had given a still diff erent account of the events of December 6–7. Clausen had shown Bratton several sworn affi davits submitted by men Bratton knew, some of them Bratton’s superiors in the Army. Bratton had interpreted some of those affi davits as diff ering from his previous testimony, although on examination it is apparent that they were not actual contradictions so much as merely carefully crafted evasions. However, they infl uenced Bratton to revise his statement. 185 In his affi davit for Clausen, Bratton had said that, after receiving the fi rst 13 parts of the Japanese reply and ascertaining that the 14th part would not be coming in that evening, he had directed Dusenbury “to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff at his home at Fort Myer.” Th e affi davit stated further, in contradiction to his APHB testimony, that he had delivered only one set of those 13 parts that evening himself, the set destined for the secretary of state, which he had left “between 10 and 11:00 p.m.” with 183Ibid., part 29, p. 2349. 184Ibid., pp. 2349 (September 30, 1944); 2419, 2421–22 (October 2, 1944); and 2455 (October 6, 1944). 185Ibid., part 10, p. 4616.

784 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy the night duty offi cer at the State Department. He also said in his affi davit that the sets for the other offi cials on Bratton’s list “were delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth part.” Bratton had said that when he saw Marshall that morning, Marshall had on his desk the 14-part message, which he “had not given him.” He could not explain how it had reached Marshall. According to Bratton, Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my statements here [the affi davit for Clausen] . . . should be modifi ed and considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. Th is affi davit now represents my best recollection . . . after having my memory refreshed in several ways and respects. 186 By the time Bratton was fi nally called to the witness stand by the Joint Congressional Committee, he had been listening for months to the sworn testimony of witnesses, some of whom had contradicted one another; some had even contradicted their own earlier testimony, and some had off ered to shoulder the blame for Marshall’s possible delinquencies. 187 As the bewildered Bratton took the chair on February 14, 1946, suspense pervaded the packed hearing room. Delivery to Top Officials Evening of December 6 of Japanese Reply to U.S. “Ultimatum” Respecting the receipt of the “Pilot Message,” Bratton contradicted the testimony of his Navy opposite, Kramer. Kramer’s “refreshed” testimony was that the message had not reached him, ready for delivery, until about 10 or 10:30 Sunday morning, December 7. 188 However, it was undoubtedly available to Navy 186 Ibid., part 35, pp. 96–98, Bratton affi davit. 187 Ibid., part 3, p. 1036. 188 Ibid., part 9, pp. 4015, 4018–19, 4022, 4101–02.

Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 3 783<br />

On September 30, 1944, when appearing before the Army<br />

<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Board, Bratton testifi ed that he had “had the bulk<br />

<strong>of</strong> it [the Japanese reply] since the evening” <strong>of</strong> December 6. “It<br />

came in fourteen parts. . . . Th irteen <strong>of</strong> those parts were received<br />

the afternoon <strong>and</strong> evening <strong>of</strong> the 6th.” 183 He said he had delivered<br />

the fi rst 13 parts to three recipients that evening: “the <strong>of</strong>fi ce<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff [actually Marshall’s secretary, Colonel, later<br />

General, Bedell Smith], the A.C. <strong>of</strong> S. G-2 [actually Gerow’s<br />

executive <strong>of</strong>fi cer, Colonel Gailey], the <strong>of</strong>fi ce <strong>of</strong> the Secretary <strong>of</strong><br />

State.” 184<br />

On July 27, 1945, in an affi davit for Clausen, who was touring<br />

the Army’s several theaters <strong>of</strong> operations under orders <strong>of</strong> Stimson<br />

to interview <strong>and</strong> collect sworn affi davits from persons involved<br />

in some way with <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>, Bratton had given a still diff erent<br />

account <strong>of</strong> the events <strong>of</strong> December 6–7. Clausen had shown<br />

Bratton several sworn affi davits submitted by men Bratton knew,<br />

some <strong>of</strong> them Bratton’s superiors in the Army. Bratton had interpreted<br />

some <strong>of</strong> those affi davits as diff ering from his previous testimony,<br />

although on examination it is apparent that they were not<br />

actual contradictions so much as merely carefully crafted evasions.<br />

However, they infl uenced Bratton to revise his statement. 185<br />

In his affi davit for Clausen, Bratton had said that, after<br />

receiving the fi rst 13 parts <strong>of</strong> the Japanese reply <strong>and</strong> ascertaining<br />

that the 14th part would not be coming in that evening, he had<br />

directed Dusenbury “to deliver the set for the Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff at his<br />

home at Fort Myer.” Th e affi davit stated further, in contradiction<br />

to his APHB testimony, that he had delivered only one set <strong>of</strong><br />

those 13 parts that evening himself, the set destined for the secretary<br />

<strong>of</strong> state, which he had left “between 10 <strong>and</strong> 11:00 p.m.” with<br />

183Ibid., part 29, p. 2349.<br />

184Ibid., pp. 2349 (September 30, 1944); 2419, 2421–22 (October 2, 1944); <strong>and</strong><br />

2455 (October 6, 1944).<br />

185Ibid., part 10, p. 4616.

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