Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 781
Why would he, Kramer, “send a message that involved the
British and the Japanese a thousand miles from any of our
possessions directly to the information of CincPac, which was
Admiral Kimmel,” 175 when he had not sent to either the Pacifi c
or Asiatic Fleet the ship movement message, “which set up a plan
of Pearl Harbor, indicating what they wanted it for was an attack
later.” 176
Kramer said that “Every message bearing on ship movements,
either of our Navy, our merchant marine, or foreign navies, specifi
cally England, was given high priority in my section and all
were translated and disseminated by my section.” 177 He admitted
that the Japanese had “used [this grid bombing map] for all ship
movements subsequently to setting up of this abbreviated system
of reporting ships in Pearl Harbor.” 178 However, “evaluation . . . was
never at any time a function of his section.” 179 Moreover, Kramer
pointed out, Pearl Harbor was not the only base the Japanese had
been watching: “Back in 1940, during the course of negotiations
with the Dutch in Java . . . the Japanese conducted rather rigorous
reconnaissance of all military establishments, not only in Java but
in other islands of the Dutch East Indies.” Th ey had also requested
information on the “military establishments, air bases, fl eet facilities,
in Panama and in part of the Western Hemisphere under
United States jurisdiction. Th e Japanese diplomatic service, as
well as their military and naval attaches abroad,” Kramer testifi ed,
“were very conscientious people and reported in meticulous detail
all facts that they could learn. . . . Th ey likewise reported in great
detail the air bases in the vicinity of Seattle and Bremerton Navy
175Ibid., p. 4176–77.
176Ibid., part 12, p. 261, Exhibit 2, p. 12, Tokyo to Honolulu Message #83.
177Ibid., part 9, p. 4174.
178Ibid., p. 4177.
179Ibid., p. 4178.