Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

780 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Division. Yet apparently Turner had seen it that evening; he testifi
ed before the NCI that “a rather long dispatch” had been brought
to him “some time during the very late evening of December 6 or
the early morning of December 7. . . . [T]he offi cer who brought
the dispatch to the house stated that there was a part of the message
missing . . . the latter part.” 168 Still Kramer maintained he
had neither telephoned Ingersoll nor delivered to him directly
any of these intercepts that night. 169
Kramer held also that he had not delivered the 13 parts to
Turner, although he had testifi ed to the contrary. 170 Ferguson read
an excerpt from Turner’s JCC testimony, and Kramer had to agree
that “Admiral Turner knew what he was talking about.” However,
Kramer continued to maintain that he had made no delivery to
Turner that evening. He would admit only that Turner’s recollection
“obviously diff ers from my recollections.” 171
Ferguson elicited from Kramer that he had drafted for
Noyes a December 1 message concerning Japanese movements
in Th ailand, thousands of miles from any U.S. possessions. 172
Ferguson wanted to know why, especially if Kramer “knew nothing
about our policy in case of an attack by the Japanese on the
British,” 173 he
felt that we should insure that they [CINCAF and CINCPAC]
got that picture, sir, even though they may have received it and
read it on the Asiatic station, the British also at Singapore, and
the unit at Honolulu. 174
168Ibid., part 9, p. 4027.
169Ibid., p. 4026.
170Ibid., part 4, pp. 1970–71.
171Ibid., part 9, p. 4029.
172Ibid., pp. 4175–76 (extension #2027).
173Ibid., p. 4176.
174Ibid., p. 4175.