Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 775
Kramer replied that he
did not, at least, know positively but certainly at the time and
now presumed from the context of the parts we were breaking
down that that must be the reply to Mr. Hull’s note of 26
November. 153
Ferguson tried to fi nd out what there was in the records to
show whether the “Pilot Message” had actually been received in
the Navy Department Saturday, December 6, or Sunday morning,
December 7. Kramer admitted that “Th ere is nothing whatsoever
in the fi le, Senator, to show defi nitely one way or another
that point.” 154
Kramer repeated again the next day his account of the Sunday
morning receipt and delivery of the “Pilot Message.” His “present
belief,” he told the JCC, was that he “did not get it in my section
from the Army until the next morning, Sunday, December 7. . . .
Sometime between 9 and 10:30 that morning.” His memory had
been “refreshed . . . since I got to studying this on my arrival at
Washington.” 155
As a matter of fact, Kramer told the JCC two days later that
he did not believe the “Pilot Message” had even been included
with the fi rst delivery early on the morning of the 7th, but that it
had become available only in time for the second round of deliveries.
According to the “study I made . . . a few days ago, my best
knowledge and present conviction is that my section in the Navy
Department did not receive it until approximately 10:25 or 10:30
Sunday morning.” 156 His “sole reason” for saying this, he told
Ferguson, was “due to the fact that in the Navy book it [the “Pilot
Message”] appears after the 14-part message and after the 1:00
153 Ibid., p. 4019.
154 Ibid., pp. 4019–20.
155 Ibid., p. 4102.
156 Ibid., p. 4188.