Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 773
“Not over 30 seconds. Probably nearer 10 or 15 seconds” with
the “Winds Execute” before it was handed to Saff ord. He had
not been involved in its decoding, translation, and delivery. It was
“by mere chance” that he had happened to be in his offi ce as the
GY watch offi cer passed on his way to deliver it to Saff ord. Th us,
Lucas implied, Kramer’s contact with the message was so brief
that it was not surprising his recollections were not too clear. 146
“Pilot Message” Received, Announcing Japan’s
Response to U.S. November 26 “Ultimatum”
On Saturday morning, December 6, 1941, U.S. intelligence
picked up a Japanese dispatch that became known as the “Pilot
Message” because it announced to the Japanese ambassadors in
Washington the impending arrival of their government’s 14-part
response to the U.S. note of November 26 rejecting their latest
proposal for compromise. Th is “Pilot Message” told the Japanese
ambassadors that the time for its presentation to the United
States would be wired separately 147 —in “Purple”-coded English;
it would need decrypting but not translating.
Th e time sheet shows that the “Pilot Message” was intercepted
by a Navy station on the west coast December 6, 1941,
between 7:15 to 7:20 a.m. (east-coast time) and then teletyped
in Japanese code to the Navy in Washington. 148 It was more than
four hours later (12:05 p.m.) when the Army, whose day it was
to decode, received it from the Navy. Th is abnormal delay was
never accounted for. It was then decoded, typed up by the Army’s
Signal Intelligence Service, and delivered to the Army and Navy
offi cer couriers.
146 Ibid., pp. 4145–46.
147 Ibid., part 12, pp. 238–39.
148 Ibid., part 14, p. 1413, Exhibit 41, message time sheet.