Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 769
Keefe: Now, you, as the man in charge of translations of these
messages, with knowledge that the whole Government was
set up to pick up this very vital and important message, who
handled that message, who saw it, who read it, who checked
the interpretation of the watch offi cer on that message, sit here
before us today, and say you can’t tell us what the message said,
you have no collection of what it said at all; is that correct?
Kramer: Th at is correct, sir. However, I would like to point out
to you, Mr. Keefe, that I think that an entirely unwarranted
emphasis and importance is being attributed to that message,
not only in this hearing but in past hearings, and in the press.
Th ere were many other messages more specifi c as to Japanese
intentions during this period. . . . A wind message would have
been only one further indication of the general trend of this traffi
c as well as the general trend of the international situation.
Keefe: Well I am very happy that you have made that statement,
Captain, because I have concluded that, as one member of
this committee, a long time ago that there were plenty of messages
to have warned those who read them and saw them that
war was imminent and just about to break, without this winds
execute message. But, Captain Kramer, the Navy Department
and all of the offi cials in the Navy Department—and I assume
the War Department, too—considered that that winds execute
message was of supreme importance, otherwise why did they
set up this great set-up of cards and treat it as they did, with
complete priority over every other message that was received?
. . . Well it did appear, didn’t it. . . . Now, this message came in
over the teletype, didn’t it? . . .
Kramer: Yes, sir.
Keefe: Yes. You saw it?
Kramer: I saw it. 140
140 Ibid., pp. 4138–39.