Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

768 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Keefe: So as late as the time you testifi ed before Admiral
Hewitt you were of the opinion that it may have contained the
words “Higashi no kaze ame,” but you were becoming uncertain
about it in the light of your further refreshing?
Kramer: I meant to imply by that specifi cally that I did not
recall, and still do not recall, the precise wording of the Japanese
on the piece of teletype paper. . . .
Keefe: So we now get to the point of your testimony here that
there was a message, it had something on it, and must have had
something on it to designate it as a wind code execute message?
. . . Th en I am to understand, Captain Kramer, that this message,
which was considered of top importance by everybody,
which everybody was looking for and on the lookout for, and
for which you have testifi ed specifi c arrangements had been set
up as in connection with no other message, after this message
comes in you see it, you read it, you determine that this is the
message you have been looking for, and you can’t tell us now
what was on that message? . . . Or what it said? . . .
Kramer: Th at is correct, sir. 139
Keefe: . . . . Th en Mr. Sonnett examined you about a lot of other
matters. Th en, Captain Kramer, at the conclusion of the examination
of Admiral Hewitt, is it a fair assumption to conclude
that as far as your testimony discloses, there was a wind execute
code message received in the middle of the week, the exact date
of which you were then uncertain, which may have referred to
the United States, England, or possibly Russia, you were not
certain: you were not then certain, and you are not certain what
the message specifi cally said but it may have referred to one or
both or all three of the countries in the original code set-up; is
that what you meant to tell Admiral Hewitt?
Kramer: Th at is what I meant to tell him at the time. . . .
139 Ibid., pp. 4136–37.