Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

56 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Roosevelt sailed aboard the Tuscaloosa on a post-election cruise
for rest and refl ection. 9 While at sea, he received a 4,000-word
plea from Churchill for American naval escorts in the Atlantic,
2,000 aircraft per month, and much, much more. Churchill stated
further that “orders already placed or under negotiation . . . many
times exceed the total exchange resources remaining at the disposal
of Great Britain. Th e moment approaches when we shall
no longer be able to pay cash.” 10 Th e ball was clearly in FDR’s
court.
Stephenson, the British agent “Intrepid,” described the
U.S.-British relationship at the end of 1940 as “a common-law
alliance.” 11 In other words, the United States and Britain were
“bound” in a relationship that did not enjoy the blessing or sanction
of law, a relationship that existed in spite of the offi cially
enacted U.S. Neutrality Act and in spite of Roosevelt’s pledges
to the people of the United States that he would not permit the
nation to become involved in “entangling foreign alliances” or
“intervention in foreign disputes.”
Lend-Lease for Peace
It was apparent that the British could no longer operate on
a cash-and-carry basis. FDR had been trying for some time to
devise a new arrangement to help England. Finally, he hit on what
became known as “lend-lease.” On returning from his cruise, he
announced at a press conference a new aid-to-Britain program.
In his folksy manner, he explained:
9 Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941, pp. 261–62.
10 Loewenheim, et al., Roosevelt and Churchill: Th eir Secret Wartime Correspondence,
p. 125.
11 William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: Th e Secret War (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 155.