Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 765
him into changing his opinion “or anything of that kind.” 131
Kramer was also interviewed at the hospital by reporters. 132
Kramer’s NCI “Winds Code” Testimony
vs. his “Refreshed” JCC Testimony
In his December 1943 and January 1944 letters, Saff ord had
asked Kramer about his recollections of the pre-attack situation in
Washington, especially about the “Winds Execute” and Kramer’s
December 6–7 intercept deliveries. When Kramer appeared
before the JCC, Keefe questioned him about his 1944 memorandum
prepared for Admiral Halsey. 133 In that memorandum and
again before the NCI, Kramer had detailed his role in translating
and delivering the pre-attack intercepts. Passage by passage,
Keefe went over the memorandum with Kramer. And passage by
passage, Kramer modifi ed his 1944 statements. 134
Th ere were serious discrepancies between Kramer’s earlier
(1944) NCI testimony and his later newly “refreshed” JCC recollections
concerning the receipt, or non-receipt, of a “Winds
Execute.” At the NCI, Kramer had testifi ed quite readily about
the “Winds Execute,” even volunteering details on his own:
“Higashi No Kaze Ame is East Wind, Rain. . . . Th e sense of that,
however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly
even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United
States.” 135 However, when Keefe questioned Kramer, he waffl ed:
Keefe: Was it the truth?
131 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 9, p. 3964.
132 Ibid., p. 4078.
133 Ibid., part 9, pp. 4080–81.
134 Ibid., pp. 4093ff .
135 Ibid., p. 4128.