Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

762 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Kramer had not been called to testify before the Roberts
Commission or the Hart inquiry. However, in 1943–44, when
stationed in the South Pacifi c, he had had occasion to review
the pre-attack situation. At that time he received two letters
from Saff ord—one dated December 22, 1943, 115 which he had
answered, and a second dated January 22, 1944, 116 which he had
not. 117 Th en in mid-May 1944, Kramer’s commanding offi cer,
Halsey, received a letter from Kimmel. 118 Kimmel asked Halsey
to consult Kramer about the “Winds Execute” and the December
6-7 deliveries of the crucial last-minute Japanese intercepts to top
Washington offi cials.
Kramer reviewed the situation in his mind at that time and
wrote a memorandum “For the benefi t of Halsey,” answering in
eff ect both Saff ord’s second letter and Kimmel’s letter to Halsey.
Halsey read Kramer’s memorandum and returned it to him. 119
Kramer did not send it to Saff ord. For reasons of security, he
made only a single copy, which he retained in his personal fi les in
a sealed envelope. 120
In September 1944 Kramer was issued travel orders to go
from Halsey’s headquarters in New Caledonia to Pearl Harbor
to testify before the Navy Court of Inquiry. When he appeared
on September 13 he spoke quite readily about the arrangements
made to intercept weather broadcasts, about his having been
115Ibid., part 8, pp. 3698–99.
116Ibid., pp. 3700–04.
117Ibid., part 9, p. 4093.
118Ibid., p. 4080–81; also part 18, pp. 3333–34, Exhibit 150, Kimmel letter to
Halsey.
119Ibid., part 9, pp. 4079–84. See also pp. 4096–124, Kramer 1944 memorandum.
120Ibid., pp. 4153–56.