Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 761 but at the time of the attack he had actually been serving under Saff ord in the security section. During the crucial months before December 7, he had been the Navy’s courier and Japanese translator. A couple of years after the attack, he was sent to the Pacifi c where he served under Admiral Nimitz in Pearl Harbor and then under Admiral Halsey in Noumea, New Caledonia. He had been promoted during the war from lieutenant commander to captain. 113 As Japanese translator and Navy courier, Kramer had been a crucial player in the pre-attack situation. It was hoped that, with his intimate knowledge of the Japanese intercepts, he would be able to shed some light on the receipt of these intercepts and the timing of their delivery to the various recipients. When he was sworn in by Chairman Barkley, the old Senate Caucus Room was packed, the audience tense in anticipation. Among those who had been attending the hearings regularly for weeks was Alice Roosevelt Longworth, daughter of the late Republican president, Th eodore Roosevelt, and widow of the late speaker of the House, Nicholas Longworth. Mrs. Longworth was in her usual seat on a bench behind the committee members. At the other end of the room, was Mrs. Kramer, who was often seen, standing on her seat nervously biting her fi ngernails, during the fi ve days her husband was a witness. Kramer said he had been thoroughly familiar with the Japanese MAGIC intercepts, but “It was not essential for the activities of my section that I be so familiar with the negotiations,” nor with the status of the diplomatic arrangements and intercourse between this country and Japan. 114 However, his familiarity with the intercepts clearly made him one of JCC’s most important witnesses. 113 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 8, pp. 3894–95, 3897. 114 Ibid., part 36, p. 81.

762 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Kramer had not been called to testify before the Roberts Commission or the Hart inquiry. However, in 1943–44, when stationed in the South Pacifi c, he had had occasion to review the pre-attack situation. At that time he received two letters from Saff ord—one dated December 22, 1943, 115 which he had answered, and a second dated January 22, 1944, 116 which he had not. 117 Th en in mid-May 1944, Kramer’s commanding offi cer, Halsey, received a letter from Kimmel. 118 Kimmel asked Halsey to consult Kramer about the “Winds Execute” and the December 6-7 deliveries of the crucial last-minute Japanese intercepts to top Washington offi cials. Kramer reviewed the situation in his mind at that time and wrote a memorandum “For the benefi t of Halsey,” answering in eff ect both Saff ord’s second letter and Kimmel’s letter to Halsey. Halsey read Kramer’s memorandum and returned it to him. 119 Kramer did not send it to Saff ord. For reasons of security, he made only a single copy, which he retained in his personal fi les in a sealed envelope. 120 In September 1944 Kramer was issued travel orders to go from Halsey’s headquarters in New Caledonia to Pearl Harbor to testify before the Navy Court of Inquiry. When he appeared on September 13 he spoke quite readily about the arrangements made to intercept weather broadcasts, about his having been 115Ibid., part 8, pp. 3698–99. 116Ibid., pp. 3700–04. 117Ibid., part 9, p. 4093. 118Ibid., p. 4080–81; also part 18, pp. 3333–34, Exhibit 150, Kimmel letter to Halsey. 119Ibid., part 9, pp. 4079–84. See also pp. 4096–124, Kramer 1944 memorandum. 120Ibid., pp. 4153–56.

Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 3 761<br />

but at the time <strong>of</strong> the attack he had actually been serving under<br />

Saff ord in the security section. During the crucial months before<br />

December 7, he had been the Navy’s courier <strong>and</strong> Japanese translator.<br />

A couple <strong>of</strong> years after the attack, he was sent to the Pacifi c<br />

where he served under Admiral Nimitz in <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

then under Admiral Halsey in Noumea, New Caledonia. He had<br />

been promoted during the war from lieutenant comm<strong>and</strong>er to<br />

captain. 113<br />

As Japanese translator <strong>and</strong> Navy courier, Kramer had been a<br />

crucial player in the pre-attack situation. It was hoped that, with<br />

his intimate knowledge <strong>of</strong> the Japanese intercepts, he would be<br />

able to shed some light on the receipt <strong>of</strong> these intercepts <strong>and</strong> the<br />

timing <strong>of</strong> their delivery to the various recipients.<br />

When he was sworn in by Chairman Barkley, the old Senate<br />

Caucus Room was packed, the audience tense in anticipation.<br />

Among those who had been attending the hearings regularly<br />

for weeks was Alice Roosevelt Longworth, daughter <strong>of</strong> the late<br />

Republican president, Th eodore Roosevelt, <strong>and</strong> widow <strong>of</strong> the late<br />

speaker <strong>of</strong> the House, Nicholas Longworth. Mrs. Longworth was<br />

in her usual seat on a bench behind the committee members. At<br />

the other end <strong>of</strong> the room, was Mrs. Kramer, who was <strong>of</strong>ten seen,<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ing on her seat nervously biting her fi ngernails, during the<br />

fi ve days her husb<strong>and</strong> was a witness.<br />

Kramer said he had been thoroughly familiar with the Japanese<br />

MAGIC intercepts, but “It was not essential for the activities<br />

<strong>of</strong> my section that I be so familiar with the negotiations,” nor<br />

with the status <strong>of</strong> the diplomatic arrangements <strong>and</strong> intercourse<br />

between this country <strong>and</strong> Japan. 114 However, his familiarity with<br />

the intercepts clearly made him one <strong>of</strong> JCC’s most important<br />

witnesses.<br />

113 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 8, pp. 3894–95, 3897.<br />

114 Ibid., part 36, p. 81.

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