Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

758 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th e “One p.m. Message” had come in early that Sunday morning.
Yet, Murphy pointed out, Saff ord had had no one on duty to
translate that message promptly. He had left the offi ce Saturday
at 4:30 p.m. and was at home, in Murphy’s words, “still in pajamas
having breakfast at 2:00.” 102
Saff ord explained that he had fulfi lled his responsibilities as
head of the security section of Naval Communications before he
left the department on Saturday. He had done his best to alert the
men in the fi eld by sending out instructions concerning the need
to destroy confi dential codes and ciphers. He was not authorized
to send out warnings to the fi eld, and he had no responsibility
to issue orders to the translators. 103 Neither the Japanese reply to
our note of November 26 nor the “One p.m. Message” had come
in before Saff ord’s duty ended on Saturday. Moreover, Sunday
was his “regular day off .” 104 Even so, Murphy practically accused
Saff ord of not being interested in protecting the American navy.
Murphy: Do I understand you to say you were not responsible
for anything at all that might help with winning the war?
Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I don’t think that the answer bears any
such interpretation. I think it is an unfair question. Th e witness
didn’t testify to any such thing. Th e witness is entitled to some
degree of fairness and fair play. . . . I object because the witness
has testifi ed that under the setup he had no responsibility for
translators. You are trying to make it appear that he did have
and had no interest in protecting the welfare of the Nation. 105
When Keefe had an opportunity to question Saff ord, he said
he was “puzzled” and assumed other committee members were
102Ibid., pp. 3715–18.
103Ibid., p. 3746.
104Ibid., p. 3777.
105Ibid., p. 3746.