Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 757
Senator Scott W. Lucas also questioned Saff ord ruthlessly
about his letter to Kramer. He asked especially why the men whose
names Saff ord had mentioned, “loyal and patriotic Americans” all,
would want to secrete or destroy or disturb an important message
of this kind. Saff ord fi nally said that he really had “no proper basis
for suspicion” against Stark and Marshall. He had “no suspicion
directed against any individual who can be named.” But the fact
remained. “Offi cial records have disappeared from the fi les of the
Navy Department, and that is a suspicious circumstance. I have
no idea how they disappeared. It is a fact that they are not present
and cannot be accounted for.” However, Saff ord said he had “no
suspicion against any individual.” He could name nobody. 99
Representative J. Bayard Clark was also relentless in questioning
Saff ord. Th e eff ect of Saff ord’s “Winds Execute” testimony if
true, Clark pointed out, was to accuse the most senior Army and
Navy offi cers—Stark and Marshall—not only of “neglect of duty”
but also of violating the criminal law of the land by secreting,
removing, defacing or destroying public records. Saff ord admitted
that his testimony was diametrically opposed to that of other
witnesses. However, he said, the fact remained that documents
were missing from the fi les. 100
Murphy even badgered Saff ord about his behavior at the time
of the attack. Saff ord told the committee he had interpreted the
“Winds Execute” to mean
that war would commence within two or three days in all
probability, possibly Saturday, December 6, possibly Sunday,
December 7. Th at was the best estimate that could be made as
to the timing implied by a message of that nature. 101
99Ibid., pp. 3704–06.
100Ibid., pp. 3684–86.
101Ibid., p. 3684.