Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

U.S. Ties to Britain Strengthened 55
British Ambassador Lord Lothian had been advised in
October that his discussions with the United States about further
supplies for England would have to wait until after the election.
On returning to Washington on November 23, he spoke with
newsmen. “Well, boys,” he remarked, “Britain’s broke; it’s your
money we want.” 5 FDR, Morgenthau, and Churchill all chided
him for this “calculated indiscretion.” 6 In his defense, Lord
Lothian reported to London that
American public opinion . . . was still “saturated with illusions
. . . that we have vast resources available that we have not
yet disclosed . . . and that we ought to empty this vast hypothetical
barrel before we ask for assistance.” It was this fact, he
explained, which had induced him to make his statement. It
is clear that the exhaustion of funds could hardly have been
concealed much longer. 7
A week after that, Sir Walter Layton, director-general of programs
in the British ministry of supply, submitted to Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau a paper headed “Initial Orders to be placed
for Output.” Th e British document cited a fi gure of $2,062 million
plus $699 million for “Capital Investment necessary for
creating New Productive Capacity.” 8 Morgenthau immediately
took this document to FDR and asked for instructions. Th us,
Roosevelt was fi nally forced to face up to the question, which he
had successfully avoided until then, of fi nancing Britain’s urgent
purchases.
5 Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds. Roosevelt
and Churchill: Th eir Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1975), p. 125n.
6 Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: Th e Partnership Th at Saved
the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 261.
7 Hall, North American Supply, p. 258.
8 Ibid., p. 259.