Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 751
the fi rst time that I did not know that I was standing alone against
the world in my testimony.” 72
Seeking Corroboration of His Memory
Safford Writes Kramer on Duty in the Pacific
Saff ord knew that Kramer was familiar with the “Winds
Execute.” After all, it was Kramer who had translated the crucial
passages and handed the teletyped intercept to Saff ord on the
morning of December 4. Th en a week or so later Kramer and
Saff ord together had gone over “a special folder of messages leading
up to Pearl Harbor” that Kramer was assembling for Acting
Navy Secretary Forrestal, in Secretary Knox’s absence from the
country—in Hawaii, then a territory, not yet a state—to investigate
the attack. Saff ord believed a copy of the “Winds Execute”
was included in that special folder. 73
Saff ord had discussed the “Winds” intercept with Kramer in
the spring of 1943, before Kramer left for Pearl Harbor and active
duty in the Pacifi c. At that time Kramer’s memory, Saff ord said,
coincided with his own. Th ey had not then looked for it, for they
had both expected to “fi nd everything pertaining to that winds
message in the fi les.” 74 In any event, the “Winds Execute” was not
then in controversy. 75
Ferguson also quoted from NCI Top Secret testimony by Admiral Turner to
the eff ect that he had learned on December 6 that “Th e Winds message came
in” and that it meant “at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably
war.” Also a Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder who had testifi ed before the Roberts
Commission to “three signal words . . . as an indication that the code had been
followed and that the attack was planned” (ibid., part 8, pp. 3792–94).
72Ibid., p. 3793.
73Ibid., p. 3689.
74Ibid., pp. 3693, 3697.
75Ibid., pp. 3731, 3774–76.