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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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750 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Until the August 1945 release to the press <strong>of</strong> the SECRET<br />

Army <strong>and</strong> Navy <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> reports, the public had heard little<br />

or nothing about “Winds Code.” Saff ord gave Hart a list <strong>of</strong> “15<br />

reliable witnesses” he believed had seen the “Winds Execute.” 67 In<br />

a May 14, 1945, memor<strong>and</strong>um to Lieutenant Comm<strong>and</strong>er John<br />

F. Sonnett, assistant attorney general in the Navy who had served<br />

as counsel to the Hewitt investigation, Saff ord listed 26 <strong>of</strong>fi cers<br />

who he believed had known <strong>of</strong> its interception on December 4,<br />

1941. 68 But when questioned, they denied it. Most <strong>of</strong> the people<br />

who had been in a position before the attack to know <strong>of</strong> the<br />

“Winds Execute,” if it had existed, swore they had never seen<br />

it. 69 In spite <strong>of</strong> their testimony, Saff ord believed that McCollum,<br />

Wilkinson, Hewitt, <strong>and</strong> Noyes, among others, knew it had been<br />

intercepted.<br />

By the time Saff ord appeared before the committee, he could<br />

not name a single person whom he could confi dently expect to<br />

corroborate the pre-attack receipt <strong>of</strong> the message; he “would<br />

rather not attempt to estimate what any other witness is going<br />

to say on the st<strong>and</strong>.” 70 Ferguson then cited three or four persons<br />

involved in the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> investigations other than Saff ord<br />

who admitted to having seen a “Winds Execute” prior to the<br />

attack. He quoted specifi cally from the testimony <strong>of</strong> Assistant<br />

Chief <strong>of</strong> Naval Operations Admiral Ingersoll before the Hart<br />

Inquiry <strong>and</strong> the Naval Court <strong>of</strong> Inquiry 71 —Saff ord said this “was<br />

the receiving stations were free to destroy their copies if they wished. Or they<br />

could retain them temporarily for reference.<br />

67Ibid., p. 3727.<br />

68Ibid., p. 3611; part 18, p. 3347, Exhibit 151.<br />

69Ibid., part 8, pp. 3759–60.<br />

70Ibid., p. 3727.<br />

71Ibid., pp. 3788–90, Ingersoll testimony before the Hart Inquiry. Concerning<br />

others who admitted having seen a “Winds execute” prior to the attack, Ferguson<br />

cited an affi davit by a Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew referring to an “implementation<br />

message” which he had seen “on or about the 5th <strong>of</strong> December 1941.”

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