Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

748 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
destroy all secret and confi dential publications. . . . retaining
minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications.
. . . Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of
emergency all classifi ed matter you retain. 60
Th en in the attempt to warn Wake, Saff ord prepared a
strong message that read in part: “In view of imminence of war
destroy all registered publications on Wake Island except this
system and current editions of aircraft code and direction fi nder
code.” 61 Ingersoll refused to send this strongly worded message
as drafted by Saff ord. He released instead an “ambiguous” message
with Wake’s name deleted from the text. 62 Moreover, it was
held up until December 6, when it “was sent deferred precedence
which meant delivery [in Pearl Harbor for relay to Wake] by 9:00
on Monday morning, December 8, 1941.” Saff ord didn’t know
when it got to Pearl Harbor but, he said,
no action was taken on it until long after the attack on Pearl
Harbor; and then, because we had sent an ambiguous message,
the fl eet communication offi cer sent another ambiguous
message. Th e net result was that when Wake was captured, I
believe the 24th of December, some of the cryptographic aids
fell into Japanese hands, and it was reported at the time by
Commandant 14th Naval District, and later on some of the
alphabet strips were captured at Kiska in some of the abandoned
Japanese dugouts. 63
Given the limitations of their responsibilities and the Navy’s
restrictions on their duties, Saff ord and McCollum did all they
60 Ibid., part 8, p. 3845; part 14, p. 1408, #042017; part 29, p. 2398, #042017.
Saff ord testimony at APHB; part 33, pp. 1178–79. #042017, NCI Exhibit 21.
Information copy to commander-in-chief, Pacifi c Fleet.
61 Ibid., part 29, p. 2399.
62 Ibid., part 14, p. 1408; part 29, p. 2399.
63 Ibid., part 29, p. 2399.