Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 747
it.” 54 Saff ord learned much later that the McCollum message had
not been sent. 55
Safford Responds to “Winds Execute”
as Chief, Naval Communications Security
Being in charge of the security section of Naval
Communications, Saff ord’s jurisdiction and responsibilities were
limited to maintaining the security of communications; he was
not permitted to send evaluations or orders to men in the fi eld. 56
Any messages he sent had to deal specifi cally with maintaining
document security. In fulfi llment of this obligation and as a result
of the receipt of the “Winds Execute,” he fi led four messages
for transmittal between 3:00 and 3:20 p.m. on the afternoon of
December 4. He instructed the naval attachés at Tokyo, Peiping,
Bangkok, and Shanghai “to destroy all secret and confi dential fi les
except those essential for current purposes.” 57 Similar instructions
were sent to the commander-in-chief Asiatic Fleet in Manila. 58
Saff ord also sent a PRIORITY message to Guam and Samoa
at 8 p.m. ordering a change in codes from their then-current
code RIP 65 to a new code, RIP 66. 59 Th is order was promptly
received in Guam. Seventeen minutes later, a SECRET message
was released by Ingersoll to Guam, DEFERRED precedence to
allow time for the new code, RIP 66, to be implemented, asking
Guam to
54Ibid., p. 3812.
55Ibid., pp. 3701, 3715, 3812, 3878. See also pp. 3761–62, Saff ord’s January 22,
1944, letter to Kramer.
56Ibid., p. 3781.
57Ibid., pp. 3810, 3844; part 29, p. 2397, OpNav. No. 042019, with an information
copy to the commander-in-chief Asiatic Fleet (Hart) but not to the
C-in-C of the Pacifi c Fleet (Kimmel).
58 Ibid., part 29, p. 2397, #042018. No information copy was sent to Kimmel.
59 Ibid., p. 2397, #042000.