Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

746 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
about noon that day, December 4; the “Winds Execute” had been
included. 48 So presumably it was delivered that day to the usual
recipients. Not only that, Saff ord said, but “in addition, it was
telephoned around to various people by Admiral Noyes and so far
as I know that was the fi rst time that had ever been done.” 49
About an hour later, Noyes called Saff ord on the inter-phone.
He did not mention the “Winds Execute” specifi cally, but told
Saff ord that “we had better tell Guam to destroy all their excess
codes and ciphers.” 50 Saff ord then went to Noyes’s offi ce—that
was at about 3:00 p.m.—and there Noyes showed him a severalpage
message prepared in McCollum’s Far Eastern Section of
Naval Intelligence. 51 Th e fi nal paragraph of McCollum’s long
message, Saff ord testifi ed, closely followed the “Winds Execute”
giving “every indication . . . that Captain McCollum had read the
winds message, had appreciated its importance, and was trying to
get an urgent war warning out to the Pacifi c Fleet.” 52
Saff ord recalled that according to McCollum’s message:
“Japan was about to declare war on the United States, about to
declare war on England, including the Netherlands East Indies,
and so forth, and would maintain peace with Russia.” Th e last
sentence “added the forecast or evaluation ‘war is imminent’.” 53
After the discussion of McCollum’s message, Saff ord saw
Wilkinson leave Noyes’s offi ce with it in his hand, saying, “I am
going to send this message if I can get the front offi ce to release
48 Ibid., p. 3690.
49 Ibid., pp. 3587, 3683.
50 Ibid., pp. 3587, 3690.
51 Ibid., pp. 3667, 3761, 3811, 3812.
52 Ibid., p. 3667.
53 Ibid., pp. 3796, 3811–12.