Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 745
delivered it to him in his offi ce on the morning of December 4,
1941, typed on yellow teletype paper. 45 It had indicated war with
England and with the United States. Kramer had underscored
the three code words in the message and had written below in
pencil or colored crayon a rough translation:
War with England (including NEI, etc.)
War with the U.S.
Peace with Russia.
“Th is is it!” Kramer said as he handed the paper to Saff ord.
Th is meant that Japan would soon be at war, not only with Great
Britain but also with the United States. “Th is was the broadcast
we had strained every nerve to intercept,” Saff ord said.
Th is was the feather in our cap. Th is was the tip-off which would
prevent the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet being surprised at Pearl Harbor
the way the Russians had been surprised at Port Arthur. Th is
was what the Navy Communication Intelligence had been preparing
for since its establishment in 1924—War with Japan! 46
Saff ord had immediately sent the “Winds Execute” by special
messenger to Noyes, Naval Communications. If the messenger
could not fi nd Noyes in a reasonable time, he was to let Saff ord
know. In a few minutes, Saff ord received word that the message
had been delivered. 47
Representative Clark wanted to know if Saff ord had “immediately
put it in the process of handling and distribution and disposal
just as in the case of all other magic?” Saff ord said he had.
He had checked Kramer’s folder of intercepts before Kramer had
set out to make his daily routine deliveries of MAGIC intercepts
45 Ibid., part 8, pp. 3580, 3586.
46 Ibid., p. 3586.
47 Ibid.