Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

744 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
6,” announcing that the Japanese reply to our note of November
26 was on its way. 36
Th e signifi cance of the “Winds Execute,” if received, was
reinforced by intelligence available from other sources: (1) the
Japanese cable designating November 29 the deadline for terminating
U.S.-Japanese negotiations, after which “things are
automatically going to happen;” 37 (2) the instructions to overseas
Japanese nationals to destroy their codes. 38 Th e “Winds Execute”
gained further signifi cance because of its indication that Japan
wanted to reach its nationals all over the world after their codes
were destroyed, 39 because of the positive evidence it would give
that Japan defi nitely intended to act—soon, 40 and that war was
about to start against the country or countries indicated—England?
Russia? United States? According to Saff ord, any country,
or countries, named in a “Winds Execute” would actually be
involved in the war from the very beginning, and not just as a
spectator. 41 Th us the interception of a “Winds Execute” would
provide us with an announcement of “the intentions and decision
of the Japanese Government.” 42 In Saff ord’s words, it would be “a
short range forecast” of war. 43
Saff ord testifi ed that a “Winds Execute” was actually intercepted
in Morse code, 44 and that Navy courier Kramer had
36Ibid., p. 3640.
37Ibid., p. 3770; part 12, p. 165, Tokyo Message #812.
38Ibid., part 8, p. 3770; part 12, various Tokyo Messages, pp. 209, 215, 216,
231.
39Ibid., part 8, p. 3770.
40Ibid., pp. 3711, 3770.
41Ibid., p. 3663.
42Ibid., p. 3664.
43Ibid., p. 3663.
44Ibid., p. 3579, Saff ord statement, and pp. 3642, 3708, 3769, 3843, 3848,
Saff ord testimony.