Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 743
Saff ord meant those who had been working on MAGIC and with
whom he had been in close contact, such as Kramer, McCollum,
Wilkinson, and Noyes. 31 Saff ord considered that message
clear evidence of the imminence of war. Th us he was “puzzled”
when Washington offi cials did not send out any truly urgent
warnings. 32 In Saff ord’s words, the “Winds Execute” was “the
unheeded warning of war.” 33 As soon as these Japanese “Winds
Code” setup messages were intercepted, Admiral Wilkinson,
director of Naval Intelligence, directed Saff ord through Admiral
Noyes, director of Naval Communications, to alert all intercept
stations capable of monitoring Japanese news broadcasts to listen
for such a false weather announcement. Saff ord described for the
committee the preparations he had made for intercepting this
message. 34
Saff ord not only considered the “Winds Code” setup extremely
important, 35 But he believed that the eagerness of senior U.S.
offi cers to have Japanese news programs followed closely on the
chance of intercepting such a false weather broadcast was evidence
that they shared his view that it concerned something
much more important than merely a break in diplomatic negotiations,
that receipt of a “Winds Execute” would even portend
the actual outbreak of war. U.S. government offi cials realized that
if the Japanese implemented their “Winds Code” and actually
sent such a false weather message, it would have had still further
signifi cance as a defi nite portence of confl ict. Saff ord considered
the implementation of the “Winds Code” “the most important
message we had up to the time of the pilot message on December
31Ibid., p. 3704.
32Ibid., p. 3655.
33 Ibid.
34Ibid., p. 3584.
35Ibid., pp. 3678, 3683, 3796–97.