Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

742 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Safford Claimed “Winds Execute” Was Received
before December 7. If So, Was That Significant?
Washington offi cials were well aware of the impending crisis,
Saff ord said. On December 3 the U.S. military attaché in the
American embassy in Tokyo had been ordered to destroy his
ciphers and codes. 25 On December 4, Greenwich time (December
3, Washington time), the U.S. naval attaché in Tokyo was ordered
to do the same. 26 Also on December 4 the U.S. consular agents in
the Far East had been told to destroy their codes. 27
When Saff ord knew he would be called to testify before the
Congressional Committee, he prepared a written statement. It
was primarily about the “Winds Code” setup. On November 26
and 28 Washington had learned from Tokyo Circulars 2353 and
2354 that Japan planned to broadcast in the course of a routine
news program a false weather message with a hidden meaning.
28 If the Japanese embassies and consulates worldwide had
to destroy their codes and code machines and could no longer
decipher encoded messages, this so-called “Winds Code” setup
would enable Tokyo to communicate secretly with her overseas
offi cials and to advise them when events leading to war would
“automatically begin to happen.” 29
Saff ord’s prepared statement started: “Th ere was a Winds
Message. It meant War—and we knew it meant War.” 30 By “we”
25Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1409, Secret radiogram
No.40, December 3, 1941. See also part 2, p. 841, Miles testimony.
26Ibid., part 8, p. 3782; part 14, p. 1408, Message #040330.
27Ibid., part 8, p. 3770; part 14, p. 1408, Message #040343 to CO MARDETs,
Peiping and Tientsin.
28Ibid., part 12, Exhibit 1, p. 154, Japanese Circular #2353, translated November
28, 1941, and p. 155, Japanese Circular #2354, translated November 26, 1941.
29Ibid., part 8, p. 3580.
30 Ibid., p. 3579.