Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 741
Commander, now Captain, Kramer’s safe were those on duty
under Captain Kramer. Everything was normally cleared through
Commander Harrison. Th ere were not more than ten people at
the most— translators and the yeomen on duty in Kramer’s section,
the head of the section, Saff ord, or the offi cer who relieved
Saff ord; or the Director of Naval Intelligence might possibly have
called for fi les at any time. Any higher authority would have been
given the fi les without question if he had requested them. 22 A
copy of the winds execute message should have been in the fi les
of Saff ord’s division, in the locked safe of Captain Kramer.
Saff ord: To the best of my knowledge the combination to the
safe was held by Kramer and Harrison alone. Th ere was a copy
of the combination in a sealed envelope in my safe. Th ere was
another copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in the
safe of the Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. Th at was
required for all safes in naval operations, so in case of casualty
to the man who regularly opened the safe the safe could be
opened when we had to. . . . I know of no occasion when we
ever had to open those sealed envelopes, and enter the safe. I
might add, whenever an offi cer was relieved, we changed the
combination on his safe and substituted the new cards, and that
was the only time we ever had to get into those envelopes. 23
Finally in 1944, Saff ord succeeded in locating a single set of
most of the missing intercepts, had copies made, and placed in
the fi les where they belonged. 24 However, one message, Japan’s
“Wind’s Execute” which Saff ord considered especially crucial,
was not found.
22 Ibid., part 8, pp. 3675–76.
23 Ibid.
24 Saff ord’s conversations with the author. See also chapter 21, pp. 432–33.