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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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738 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

Maintaining the Secrecy <strong>of</strong> the Japanese<br />

Intercepts <strong>and</strong> MAGIC<br />

It was apparent throughout the several investigations that special<br />

eff ort had been made to keep information about the “Purple”<br />

machines <strong>and</strong> the MAGIC intercepts secret. Quite underst<strong>and</strong>ably,<br />

extreme caution was necessary before the war to prevent any<br />

security leak. And during the war, when the intercepts were still<br />

yielding intelligence valuable in the struggle against the Japanese,<br />

it was necessary to continue to maintain tight security. However,<br />

the determination to maintain silence persisted—even after<br />

August 1945, when Japan surrendered, <strong>and</strong> even after President<br />

Truman, who had taken <strong>of</strong>fi ce on the death <strong>of</strong> FDR, had revealed<br />

the existence <strong>of</strong> MAGIC by releasing to the public the SECRET<br />

1944 reports <strong>of</strong> the Navy Court <strong>of</strong> Inquiry <strong>and</strong> the Army <strong>Pearl</strong><br />

<strong>Harbor</strong> Board. 14 When fi nally, in December 1945, the restrictions<br />

against revealing MAGIC were further relaxed to permit<br />

witnesses before the JCC “to testify <strong>and</strong> give information regarding<br />

cryptanalytic activities which had to do with the investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> incident,” 15 many witnesses revised their<br />

stories.<br />

Saff ord, Bratton, <strong>and</strong> Kramer had been intimately involved in<br />

h<strong>and</strong>ling the Japanese intercepts <strong>and</strong> each had been questioned<br />

at length during previous investigations while the war continued.<br />

Each had then faced the same dilemma—how to respond<br />

to pressures placed on them by wartime patriotism <strong>and</strong> loyalty to<br />

their superior <strong>of</strong>fi cers, <strong>and</strong> how to testify under oath to the truth<br />

as they saw it without revealing military secrets. Th en when questioned<br />

during the JCC hearings after the war <strong>and</strong> after restrictions<br />

had been relaxed, they had to decide whether to modify or to<br />

14Ibid., part 8, pp. 3736–40.<br />

15Ibid., Report, p. 498.

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