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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 3 737<br />

Had the president “personally” given him, Stark, the order<br />

to send the dispatch concerning these vessels? Stark said he had<br />

discussed with the president<br />

where this [ Japanese] expedition going south was likely to hit.<br />

His [the president’s] thought was the Kra Peninsula. . . . Th e<br />

Philippines was a possibility <strong>and</strong> . . . the East Indies, <strong>and</strong> just<br />

where it would go we did not know <strong>and</strong> these three small vessels<br />

were to assist in that determination. . . . [Y]ou will see where<br />

the president put them they were well placed to get information<br />

either positive or negative <strong>and</strong> it was for that reason <strong>and</strong><br />

for the reasons as stated in the dispatch, to get information,<br />

that he directed that be done. . . . He says “to form a defensive<br />

information patrol; to accomplish a purpose which is to observe<br />

<strong>and</strong> report by radio Japanese movements in the West China<br />

Sea <strong>and</strong> Gulf <strong>of</strong> Siam,” <strong>and</strong> then he himself designated where<br />

those vessels were to be placed <strong>and</strong> they were well placed for<br />

the purposes for which he wanted them. . . . I simply think that<br />

he thought that was additional precautions. He was intensely<br />

interested in every move at that time, as we all were. 12<br />

Of course, one cannot know what FDR had in mind in issuing<br />

this directive; it may have been out <strong>of</strong> concern for his commitments<br />

to the British <strong>and</strong> Dutch; he may have been trying to<br />

do what Stimson had suggested at FDR’s “War Cabinet” meeting,<br />

November 25, to “maneuver them [the Japanese] into the<br />

position <strong>of</strong> fi ring the fi rst shot without allowing too much danger<br />

to ourselves.” 13 Few would be killed or wounded by a shot fi red<br />

on such a minimally-equipped “U.S. man-<strong>of</strong>-war.” Yet it might<br />

be incident enough to call for U.S. military intervention against<br />

the Japanese.<br />

the message ordering these vessels to sea; he felt the order might have been a<br />

refl ection on his overfl ight reports. (PLG 1962 interview <strong>of</strong> Hart.)<br />

12 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 5, pp. 2190–91.<br />

13 Ibid., part 11, p. 5433, Stimson’s diary entry <strong>of</strong> November 25, 1941.

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