Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 3 733
learned that they were destroying their codes then the winds
message lost its importance. . . . [T]he fact that the consulates
were included cinched it in my opinion that it was war and not
a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations. 3
Ingersoll did not recall having seen any of the several “shipsin-harbor”
intercepts, not even the one that divided Pearl Harbor
into fi ve areas “to report each shifting and visit of ships from one
area to another.” If he had, he “would have wanted to know why
they were interested in the actual location of a ship within a harbor
as distinguished from whether or not the ship just happened
to be in port.” If he had seen that dispatch, his suspicion would
have been aroused. He thought “Admiral Kimmel should have
been informed.” 4
Ingersoll had known of the November 29 deadline set by the
Japanese, after which things were automatically going to happen.
It was well known that Japanese troops could reach several
potential targets in southeast Asia in a very short time: China,
Indochina, Formosa. Th e situation was reviewed almost daily,
he said, at conferences in the offi ce of Navy Secretary Knox. Yet
day after day went by after the November 29 deadline without a
Japanese strike.
Ingersoll: Th ere was a conference in Mr. Knox’ offi ce every
morning in which the Director of Naval Intelligence presented
the whole situation . . . and the possibilities were discussed . . .
by the Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner. . . . Th e situation
was reviewed every morning.
Gearhart: Were there in those meetings after the 29th discussions
of why that had occurred, after we had read the Jap
intercept that after the 29th things were going to happen
3Ibid., pp. 4232–33.
4Ibid., pp. 4236–37.