Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

728 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
7. Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their
duties in case of sudden attack.
Not guilty. I could not tell “subordinates” to expect a sudden
attack which neither I nor the War Department nor anyone
else expected. Our information regarding impending hostile
action was, by direction of the chief of staff , limited to the minimum
essential offi cers. Our standard operating procedure of 5
November 1941 prescribed fully the duties of all personnel in
event of any sudden attack.
As to the civilians,
We had a number of alerts and blackouts. We had had defi nite
training of the surgical teams and of the fi rst-aid people and of
the ambulance corps. . . . And I think that the civilian agencies
that had to act not only knew but they performed their duties
extremely well on December 7.
8. Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor.
Not guilty. I took every measure I thought necessary to protect
the fl eet and naval base against sabotage. I so reported to the
War Department. Marshall testifi ed that I was reasonable in
assuming that I was doing exactly what he wanted, because
otherwise he would have notifi ed me that he wanted more
measures taken.
9. Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile
attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
Not guilty. I was never warned of any imminent danger of an air
attack. Th e planes were therefore grouped for more adequate
protection against hostile action in the form of sabotage.
10. Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an
attack.