Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 727
3. Failure to set up an Interceptor (radar) Command.
Not guilty. We were training personnel as fast as we could to
operate an eff ective interceptor command, and it was set up
and operating as eff ectively as it could.
Short told of considerable delay encountered not only in getting
the needed equipment, but also in obtaining Department
of Interior permission to erect the radar towers on national park
land. 159
4. Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
Not guilty. We were training our personnel as fast as we
could to set up an eff ective aircraft-warning service. It was in
operation. 160
5. Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings
to interested agencies.
Not guilty. We were restricted by direct order from Marshall,
from transmitting the November 27 warning to any other
than the minimum essential offi cers. . . . If I had set up an
aircraft-warning service and gotten it to everybody we would
have had to give it to all the enlisted men.
6. Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and
coordination with the Navy.
Not guilty. We had full, complete plans for defense by cooperation
with the Navy, which had been approved by General
Marshall and Admiral Stark. . . . It would have been carried
out 100 percent if they would have given us the information
they had.
159Ibid., pp. 3157–58.
160Ibid., p. 3192. See also pp. 3057–58, 3182–84.