Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 725
Short’s retirement “had been handled entirely by the Secretary
of War [Stimson] and that he [Marshall] had had nothing to do
with it, in fact he was not cognizant of what was being done.”
However, that apparently was not the case; the correspondence,
Short said, “did not agree with that.” 154
Ferguson quoted from Short’s prepared statement to the
eff ect that he did not feel he had been “treated fairly, or with
justice by the War Department.” In that statement, he said he
thought he had been “singled out as an example, as the scapegoat
for the disaster.” 155
Ferguson: I wish you would be specifi c and tell me whom you
had in mind [by saying] the War Department?
Short: I had in mind the General Staff in particular [headed
by Marshall], because they were primarily responsible for the
policies pursued by the War Department. . . . General Gerow
as head of the War Plans Division had the direct responsibility
for keeping me informed. General Miles, the head of G-2, had
a very direct responsibility.
Ferguson: What about the Secretary of War? . . .
Short: . . . I would not have expected him to be as fully aware
of the signifi cance of technical things. I would expect him to be
fully aware of any policy.
Ferguson: Now, when you use the word “scapegoat,” will you
give us the meaning that you want to convey to us in that
word?
Short: It seems to me that may be a slang expression, but it is a
word in very common usage, and I meant just exactly what the
common usage meant, that it was someone that they saddled
154 Ibid., part 7, p. 3170.
155 Ibid., p. 2964.