Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

724 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the material which you did have at Pearl Harbor on December
7, if alerted and eff ectively used, would have given a good
account of itself and perhaps enabled you to repel the attack,
or to severely minimize the damage that was caused. Do you
agree with that?
Short said he “could have given a better account” of himself if
he had had more equipment. For example, the “best antiaircraft
defense against low-fl ying planes,” the armaments that had done
the most damage in the attack, were .50 caliber machine guns. At
the time of the attack, he had had only 109, although the program
at that time had called for 345. Th e number of .50 caliber machine
guns in Hawaii had actually been increased by December 1, 1942,
to 793, showing how many the War Department considered necessary.
“[A]nd keep in mind that that date is after the Japanese
had been seriously defeated at Midway.”
Keefe pressed on. “Th e fact of the matter is, is it not, that
except for the possibility of getting a few more guns into action
and possibly minimizing, to a small extent, the damage that was
done . . . this attack would have come in by surprise, isn’t that
true?”
Short: With the information . . . we had from Washington, it
was bound to be a surprise.” 153
Short Claims His Retirement
Handled by General Staff, Made Him
a Scapegoat; He Defends Himself Against
Roberts Commission Charges
After the attack, Short had been relieved of his command.
According to him, Marshall’s testimony “conveyed the idea” that
153 Ibid., p. 3210.